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Sparking a policy debate in the business and legal communities, on
March 25, 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Federal
Arbitration Act's grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitral awards
are exclusive and declared arbitration agreements calling for expanded judi-
cial review unenforceable.' Writing for the majority in this 6-3 decision,
Justice Souter noted as follows:
When all these arguments based on prior legal authority are done with,
Hall Street and Mattel remain at odds over what happens next. Hall
Street and its amici say parties will flee from arbitration if expanded re-
view is not open to them. One of Mattel's amici foresees flight from the
courts if it is. We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say
whether the exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat to the
popularity of the arbitrators or to that of the courts. But whatever the
consequences of our holding, the statutory text gives us no business to
2expand the statutory grounds.
Even though Hall Street and Mattel "remain[ed] at odds as to what
happens next" and Justice Souter could not foretell who was right,3 that
question-What happens next?-is vitally important to those whose busi-
ness dispute resolution strategies incorporate arbitration.
Since the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, Amer-
ican business has used arbitration with increasing frequency. Businesses
today identify a number of advantages to arbitration over the primary alter-
native, civil litigation, including: control, confidentiality, cost and time sav-
ings, and finality.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Missouri State University; J.D. University of
Tulsa College of Law, 1980; member of Arkansas and Oklahoma Bar Associations. The
author would like to express his appreciation to Robert I. Blevins for his assistance with the
legal research for this article.
1. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (hereinafter "Hall
Street").
2. Id. at 1406 (citations and footnote omitted).
3. Id.
UALR LAW REVIEW
Central to the calculus surrounding the selection of arbitration is that
business does not like litigation's unpredictability. Arbitration is seen as a
way to better manage risk through a process that allows the selection of de-
cision makers with expertise and mature judgment in the subject area. Some
participants see the finality of arbitration as a two-edged sword in high-
stakes disputes; arbitration is good insofar as a quick and cost effective reso-
lution is concerned, yet it is potentially disastrous in the event of an irration-
al award. These participants want to ameliorate that risk by agreeing to the
possibility of expanded judicial review and relief in some circumstances,
such as legal error or lack of substantial evidence-grounds not available
under the FAA. For those desiring to arbitrate under the auspices of the
FAA, the option of expanded review has now been eliminated by the Su-
preme Court in a decision eschewing any significant consideration of the
extant policy issues, hewing instead to strict rules of statutory construction.
This dispute's roots can be traced to 1925 when Congress passed the
FAA to "reduc[e] [the] technicality, delay and expense to a minimum and at
the same time safeguard[] the rights of the parties" as a result of "agitation
against the costliness and delays of litigation."4 The FAA's legislative histo-
ry reflects that Congress sought to achieve two goals: reduction of formality,
expense, and delay in the resolution of disputes and safeguarding the rights
of the parties. In Hall Street the United States Supreme Court, under the
rubric of statutory construction, struck a balance between these goals in fa-
vor of the reduction in formality, delay, and expense, concluding that the
statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards con-
tained in the FAA are exclusive and agreements to supplement those
grounds are unenforceable. In his dissent, Justice Stevens decried the deci-
sion as in conflict with Congress's "core purpose" in passing the FAA: the
"abrogat[ion] [of] the general common-law rule against specific enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements."6
The right of parties to arbitration to agree to expand the scope of judi-
cial review beyond that provided in the FAA and compel its enforcement is
in accord with the principal purpose of the FAA. 7 Proponents also say pub-
lic policy demands that disputants should not be forced to make a choice
between litigation and arbitration with no way to ensure the legal correct-
ness of the award.8 The concern is that, requiring parties to make such a
choice will cause many business managers to lose their appetite for arbitra-
4. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1408 (Stevens, Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
7. Brief for the Petitioner at 32-33, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
1396 (2008) (No. 06-989).
8. See id. at 38-39.
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tion by requiring them to "bet the company" on a process with no prospect
of meaningful review.9
The concept of judicial review limited to the bases provided by the
FAA is grounded in the Act's other primary purposes-finality and savings
of time and money.10 The thesis here is that unlimited review of arbitration
awards, structured at the parties' whim, would relegate arbitration to nothing
more than a prelude to litigation and transform it into something never fore-
seen by the drafters." Proponents also contend that the statutory text of the
FAA allows no other conclusion and that Congress has defined the bounda-
ries of judicial review under federal arbitration law.'
2
Policy considerations notwithstanding, the Court felt constrained by the
statutory text.13 It candidly acknowledged that it could not predict the prac-
tical effect of its ruling on the continued viability of arbitration without the
possibility for meaningful judicial review for legal error or substantial evi-
dence.' 4 The development of the law of arbitration, however, has been
steeped in considerations of public policy as divined by the judiciary from
the legislative history of the statute. The judiciary has been sensitive to arbi-
tration's jurisprudential development in light of the policy goals declared by
the drafters. 5 But, in Hall Street, over the objection of the dissent, the ma-
jority declined to consider those issues in any substantial way. 6 Neverthe-
less, major public policy questions are impacted by this holding. Some of
these bear on the continued efficacy of arbitration as a leading mechanism
for the resolution of disputes in the United States. As a result of the Court's
decision to resolve the issues in the virtual vacuum of statutory construction,
the political branches will be required to have the final say. Its task will be
to weigh the issues surrounding the question of whether, under the federal
arbitration statute, expanded judicial review should be available to those
who want it (and the effect on the utilization of arbitration of not having it)
9. See id. at 40.
10. Brief for Respondent at 44, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008) (No. 06-989).
11. See id. at 48.
12. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Arbitration Association in Support of Affirmance
at 5, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-989); Brief of
United States Council for International Business as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent
at 9-11, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-989); Brief of
Respondent at 20-25, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-
989).
13. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
14. See id.
15. Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270, 272-73 (1995) (citing Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) and




and then further consider appropriate statutory amendments to effectuate
that judgment.
This Article first provides an overview of the federal law of vacatur
and modification, which provided the statutory framework within which the
Hall Street decision was rendered.17 Next, this Article provides the common
law context within which the United States Supreme Court confronted the
issues in Hall Street and then further discusses the major cases giving rise to
the split among the circuit courts of appeal on the question of the authority
of parties to agree to grounds for vacatur not contained in the FAA. 8 The
majority and dissenting opinions of Hall Street, as well as the FAA's legis-
lative history, are then considered in detail. 9 The final part of the Article
presents observations and recommendations regarding the effect of the deci-
sion on the law and practice of arbitration, as well as how to address the
unresolved policy issues.2"
II. THE STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS OF HALL STREET V. MATTEL
The Hall Street majority focused on sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA
in reaching its decision. An understanding of the interplay between these
statutory provisions is essential to an appreciation of the issues involved in
that litigation and, ultimately, the decision of the United States Supreme
Court.
A. Confirmation Under Section 9
The provisions of section 9 provide the "shortcut" referred to in Justice
Souter's quotation set out at the beginning of this Article. This section gives
the winner at arbitration an expeditious way to obtain a court ordered con-
firmation of the arbitration award with, of course, some conditions. It pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration... then
... any party to the arbitration may apply to the court ... for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sec-
tions 10 and 11 of this title.2'
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part IIn.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
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Hall Street and Mattel had agreed to the entry of a judgment on the ar-
bitral award and, in addition, empowered the court to "vacate, modify or
correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of
law are erroneous. 22 This litigation began as the parties alternately at-
tempted to obtain or resist confirmation of the arbitral award under section
9.23 The Court granted certiorari to decide whether the bases for vacatur and
modification established by the FAA are exclusive. 24 Central to that task was
the determination of whether the language in section 9, "the court must grant
such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed
in sections 10 and 11 of this title," when read in conjunction with sections
10 and 11, provided the exclusive grounds for vacatur and modification, not
susceptible to expansion by agreement of the parties.25
B. Vacatur Under Section 10
Requests for vacatur of arbitration awards under the FAA are governed
by 9 U.S.C. §10, which provides for very limited review and offers only
four bases upon which the court may vacate an arbitral award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party may have been preju-
diced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.26
The issue of vacatur of arbitral awards (in general) and the interpreta-
tion of § 10 (in particular), has generated a great deal of litigation, resulting
in a considerable body of federal common law. It is important to recognize
just how difficult, as a practical matter, it is to overturn an arbitral award as
a result of the courts' narrow interpretation of the statutory grounds for va-
catur and the considerable deference afforded arbitration awards. 27 As dis-
cussed below, cases addressing the grounds for vacatur under the FAA teach
many things, but the unmistakable and overriding lessons are that such
22. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
23. Id. at 1401.
24. Id. at 1400.
25. Id. at 1405.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
27. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof 1. Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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grounds: (1) are construed in the narrowest of fashions, (2) must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence, (3) must be shown to affect the decision
of the arbitrator, and (4) must amount to more than factual or legal errors.2
Arbitral awards "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means" are
subject to vacatur under the FAA.29 Subsection 10(a) focuses on the conduct
of a party and not the arbitrator. Facts establishing corruption, fraud, or un-
due means must be supported by clear and convincing evidence 3' and must
have been undiscoverable, using due diligence, before the arbitration. 3' Be-
fore the courts will ascribe the labels "corruption," "fraud," and "undue
means" to conduct, it must be intentional, extreme, and involve serious cul-
pability amounting to immoral, or perhaps even illegal, activity. 32 The ex-
treme nature of the requisite conduct has been characterized as more than
the presentation of legally objectionable evidence at the arbitration or "slop-
py or overzealous lawyering. '' 33 For example, "undue means must be limited
to an action by a party that is equivalent in gravity to corruption or fraud,
such as a physical threat to an arbitrator or other improper influence. 34
Lastly, the existence of facts, giving rise to one of the statutory grounds, in
the abstract is not enough; a material connection to the entry of the arbitral
award must be proven.35
1. Arbitrator Misconduct
Two of the most common grounds utilized by those seeking vacatur are
evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrator.36 A mens rea
requirement for "evident partiality" has been imposed, calling for proof of
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
30. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d
1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297
(9th Cir. 1982) (discussing fraud).
31. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, 791 F.2d at 1339; see also Dogherra, 679 F.2d at 1297
and Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Machine Co., 187 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1951) (discussing
fraud).
32. See Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994); A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403--04 (9th Cir. 1992); Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
33. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 967 F.2d at 1403-04.
34. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 52 F.3d 359,
362 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
35. See Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (vacated on
other grounds), 866 F.2d 1301 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Ne-
wark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968).
36. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).
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the arbitrator's improper motive.37 An appearance of bias is insufficient.38 A
number of courts have adopted an objective standard with respect to a show-
ing of partiality, requiring evidence that "a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration. '39 The
difficulty of proving evident partiality is compounded by the fact that the
courts decline to base such a finding on evidence that is "remote, uncertain
or speculative," requiring instead evidence of bias that is "direct, definite
and capable of demonstration. ' 4° As pointed out, however, by Justice White:
This does not mean the judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in
giving effect to their [arbitrators] awards; that would be an abdication of
our responsibility. But it does mean that arbitrators are not automatically
disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if
both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are
unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial. I see no reason auto-
matically to disqualify the best informed and most capable potential arbi-
trators.4'
37. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir.
1993); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992); Apperson
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.
City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984).
38. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d at 146; Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp., 975 F.2d at
1264; Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1358; Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 83-84.
39. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005);
Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1358; Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84.
40. United States Wrestling Fed'n v. Wrestling Div. of the AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313,
318 (7th Cir. 1979); William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 266 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970).
41. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
(White, J., concurring). A variety of circumstances have been found by the courts to be insuf-
ficient to establish partiality of sufficient magnitude to warrant vacatur. See, e.g., Lucent
Techs., Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24, 28-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (arbitrator had previously
served as expert witness for party); Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983-84
(8th Cir. 2001) (previous relationship between advocate's law firm and arbitrator); Scott v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (individuals held liable for
debit balances of corporate entity whose corporate veil was pierced and arbitrators were in
debit balance collection business); Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 433-35
(11 th Cir. 1995, modified, 85 F.3d 519 (11 th Cir. 1996)) (arbitrator failed to disclose schedul-
ing dispute with law firm of advocate in arbitration proceeding). Alternatively, arbitration
awards have been set aside on the basis of evident partiality in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 158-60 (8th Cir. 1995)
(investment firm served as underwriter for company of which arbitrator was officer); Schmitz
v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9"' Cir. 1994) (undisclosed previous representation of party by
arbitrator's law firm); Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (Union was party
to arbitration and arbitrator's son was officer of that Union); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (11 th Cir. 1982) (arbitral party had undisclosed dispute with
family company of arbitrator).
20091
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The FAA also provides for vacatur "where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent in material to the controver-
sy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced. ' 42 This provision has also been interpreted quite restrictively.
The Court characterized as "very rare" procedural irregularities of sufficient
magnitude to constitute grounds for vacatur 3 In fact, the misconduct must
be so egregious as to destroy "the fundamental fairness of the arbitration
proceedings." "[F]undamental fairness," however, not procedural perfec-
tion, is the standard. "In handling evidence an arbitrator need not follow all
the niceties observed by the federal courts. He need only grant the parties a
fundamentally fair hearing. '45 Errors on the part of an arbitrator in rejecting
evidence are insufficient unless they were "in bad faith or so gross as to
amount to affirmative misconduct."46 Establishment of vacatur under this
subsection requires clear and convincing evidence 47 of misconduct that was
outcome determinative. 8
2. Arbitrator Misuse of Powers
A final statutory basis for relief from arbitration awards encompasses
circumstances in which the arbitrators exceed their powers or so imperfectly
execute them that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made.49 Lan-
guage from the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United Pa-
42. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
43. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40-41
n.10 (1987); Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J., concur-
ring).
44. Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 208, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(quoting Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 960 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
45. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir.
1974). See also Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997).
46. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 U.S. at 40. See also Bisnoff v. King, 154 F.
Supp. 2d 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Agarwal v. Agarwal, 775 F. Supp. 588, 589
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 U.S. at 40).
47. Roe v. Cargill, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 808, 815 (W.D. Ark. 2004).
48. See PaineWebber Group, Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 994 (8th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1020 (2000); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough,
967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992); M & A Elec. Power Coop. v. Local Union No. 702, 977
F.2d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1992); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d
1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). The physical and mental condition of the arbitrator has been held
to be beyond examination under the grounds of vacatur provided by the FAA. In Gearhardt
v. Cadillac Plastics Group, Inc., a question was raised as to the mental fitness of the arbitra-
tor. The court concluded that this would not suffice as grounds for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. §
10(c), even if true. 140 F.R.D. 349, 352 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
[Vol. 31
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perworkers-International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc."° illustrates just
how difficult it is to set aside an arbitral award on this basis: "[als long as
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."'" The courts' inter-
pretation of this basis for vacatur under the FAA is founded upon the maxim
that parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate when they have not agreed to
arbitrate.52 Only when the arbitrator manages to alter the parties' contract or
fails to meet contractually assigned obligations, however, can it be said that
he has exceeded his powers. 3 This basis for vacatur has also been examined
under a rubric asking whether the arbitrator has exceeded the arbitration
agreement's "essence. 54 The courts have made it clear that legal error,55
failure to specify decisional grounds, 6 or failure to state conclusions of
law5 7 are not within the ambit of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
C. Modification Under Section 11
The FAA provides the following provision for modification of arbitral
awards:
(a) [w]here there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake of the description of any person, thing, or prop-
erty referred to in the award. (b) [w]here the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. [or] (c) [w]here the
50. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
51. Id. at 38.
52. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
53. See Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir.
1992); Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (9th Cir.
1982); Western Canada S.S. Co. v. Cia. De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp. 452, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1952);
54. See, e.g. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Cigna
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 758 (5th Cir. 1999); Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26
F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1994); Seymour v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020,
1022 (10th Cir. 1993); Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 866
(6th Cir. 1990).
55. Long John Silver's Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 409 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688, n.3 (D.S.C.
2006).
56. United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 598 (1960).
57. See Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Sys., 573 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir. 1978).
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award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the con-
troversy.
58
In addition, the court is empowered to enter an order on a fine or cor-
recting an award "to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between
the parties."5 9
It is axiomatic that mistakes of fact are not sufficient to justify the
modification of an award,' and the courts have construed subsection 11 (a)
almost literally by limiting modification to situations in which there is a
mathematical error apparent on the face of the award.6 The phrase "evident
material mistake" has been similarly limited:
The plain language of the statute embraces only an "evident material
mistake" that appears in a description "in the award." Because the arbi-
tration panel crafts the award, only the panel can make a mistake in the
award. To make a "mistake" is to "understand wrongly" or to "recog-
nize or identify incorrectly.,
62
In AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. ,63
the court concluded that this subsection did not apply because it was not that
the arbitration panel did not understand, but rather, the arbitration panel was
without knowledge due to a failure of proof on the part of one of the par-
ties.' The court declared this to be beyond the statutory language of
§ 11(a).65
Likewise, an award is subject to modification if it includes a matter not
submitted.6 6 In making this determination, the court must consider whether
the arbitrator has stayed "within the areas marked out for his considera-
tion. 6 7 This, in turn, requires the court to ascertain whether the arbitrator
58. 9 U.s.C. § 1 l(a)-(c) (2006).
59. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
60. See Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274
F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960).
61. Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., Inc., 142 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir.
1998).
62. AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 999
(11 th Cir. 2007) (quoting REPWEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DIcrIONARY, 759
(1984)).
63. 508 F.3d at 999 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
64. Id. at 999-1000.
65. Id. at 1000. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the contrary holding of the Fourth Circuit
in Transnitro, Inc. v. MV. Wade, 943 F2d 471 (4th Cir. 1991), which held § 11 (a) to include
situations in which mistakes of the parties were not brought to the attention of the arbitrator.
Id. at 474.
66. 9 U.S.C. § ll(b).
67. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598, 80
S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).
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has made an award with respect to a matter not "specifically or necessarily
included in the subject matter submitted to arbitration." The decision of
courts with respect to this issue, however, is-like many issues under the
Federal Arbitration Act--colored by its policy of encouraging arbitration,
with the courts upholding awards "whenever they justly may."69
ll. THE EXCLUSIVITY OF STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR VACATUR IN
DISARRAY
By the time Hall Street reached the doorstep of the Supreme Court, two
distinct and irreconcilable views had hardened within the circuits as to the
enforceability of agreements for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
One faction, consisting of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, was undergirded by
its perception that the sanctity of the judicial process precluded such private
interference with the administration of the judicial process and its conclu-
sion that the principal purpose of the FAA is to insure finality of awards in
the interest of saving time and money. On the other side, the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits endorsed contractually expanded review,
firmly wedded to the conclusion that compelling the judicial enforcement of
the terms of private arbitration contracts lies at the heart of the FAA.
A. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Reject Contractually Expanded Review
In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 70 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
became the first circuit to limit judicial review of arbitral decisions to the
grounds set out in the Federal Arbitration Act.7' The Bowens filed suit
against Amoco for damages to their real property resulting from leakage of
oil from a pipeline across their property.72 At Amoco's request, the trial
court stayed the proceedings and ordered arbitration pursuant to a provision
in the right-of-way agreement under which the subject pipeline had been
installed.73 The Bowens and Amoco agreed that either party would have the
right to appeal the arbitral award on the grounds that it was "not supported
by the evidence" and that the decision of the district court in that regard
68. In re Arbitration Between Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers A.F.L. v. Dakota Gasification
Co., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (D.N.D., 2005) (quoting Kan. City Luggage & Novelty
Workers Union, Local No. 66 v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992, 994 (8th Cir.
1964)).
69. Sociedad Armadora Aristomenis Panama, S.A. v. Tri-Coast S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp.
738, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (citations omitted).
70. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter "Bowen").
71. Id. at 934.




would be final.74 The arbitrators awarded the landowners substantial damag-
es, and they sought to confirm the award in district court.75 Amoco filed a
motion to vacate the award and a notice of appeal to the district court, con-
tending that the award was unsupported by the evidence.76 The district court
refused to apply the parties' expanded scope of judicial review and limited
its review to those grounds set forth in the FAA, and confirmed the award
on that basis. 77 Amoco appealed, seeking vacatur of the award and either
remand for a new arbitration or to require the district court to conduct its
review under the expanded standard set out in the parties' agreement.
78
Conceding the question to be a difficult one, the court held that the
FAA and "principles announced in various Supreme [Court] decisions" fail
to support the right of parties to arbitration agreements "to alter the judicial
process by private contract., 79 It distinguished this case from the circums-
tances at issue in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,8 in which the United States Supreme Court
endorsed the right of parties to arbitration agreements to "specify by con-
tract the rules under which ... arbitration will be conducted." 81 The court
pointed out that Volt held only that the parties may structure the procedural
aspects of arbitration as they see fit, but did not sanction the freedom "to
interfere with the judicial process. 82 Acknowledging that Congress man-
dated enforcement of arbitration agreements established specific standards
for judicial review and recognized that common law principles require the
courts to resolve doubts as to arbitrability in favor of arbitration, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the conclusion that parties are at liberty to dictate standards
of review at variance with those set out in the FAA.83
In the court's view, such expanded review would undermine the FAA's
policy of limited judicial review, which "ensures judicial respect for the
arbitration process and prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements
to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results of the arbitration."' The
74. Id. at 930.
75. Id.
76. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 933. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit rejected contrary holdings of the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits. Id. at 933-34. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887-
90 (9th Cir. 1997) (hereinafter "LaPine I"), vacated in part, 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir 2003);
Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-997 (5th Cir. 1995),
abrogated by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
80. 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (hereinafter "Volt"),
81. Id. at 479.
82. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 935.
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court opined that enforcement of contractually created standards of review
would undermine the aim of finality of arbitral awards.85 The court also
quoted with approval the Eighth Circuit's description of the difference be-
tween litigation and arbitration:
We have served notice that where arbitration is contemplated the courts
are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured
judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties
should be aware that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is
far different from adjudication.
8 6
The Ninth Circuit followed suit two years later in Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.s7 Kyocera Corporation (Kyocera),
Prudential-Bache Trade Corporation (Prudential), and LaPine Technology
Corporation (LaPine) began a business enterprise in 1984.88 By 1986 LaPine
encountered financial problems and the three companies, in connection with
the reorganization of their business relationship, drafted a Definitive
Agreement and an Amended Trading Agreement.8 9 Kyocera refused to ex-
ecute the Amended Trading Agreement and LaPine subsequently filed suit
in federal district court.9" The Definitive Agreement contained an arbitration
provision, and the district court granted Kyocera's request to compel arbitra-
tion.9' The arbitrators determined that Kyocera had, in fact, entered into an
agreement with LaPine and Prudential under the terms of the Amended
Trading Agreement and that this agreement was breached by Kyocera to
both Prudential and LaPine's damage in an amount in excess of $243 mil-
85. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
86. Id. at 936 (quoting UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998
(8th Cir. 1998)).
87. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir.
2003) (hereinafter LaPine III).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 989-90.
90. Id. at 990.
91. Id. The parties' arbitral agreement contained the following provisions:
The decisions and awards of the Tribunal may be enforced by the judgment of
the Court or may be vacated, modified, or corrected by the court (a) based upon
any grounds referred to in the Act, or (b) where the Tribunal's findings of fact
are not supported by substantial evidence, or (c) where the Tribunal's conclu-
sions of law are erroneous.
Id. at 990, n.4.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, mod-
ifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any
award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration
Act, (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial




lion.92 Arguing for the standard of review set out in the arbitration clause,
Kyocera urged the district court to set aside the arbitral award based, in part,
on Kyocera's contentions that the arbitrators made errors of law and their
findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence.93 Concluding that
the FAA's limited grounds for vacatur could not be expanded by private
contract and finding no statutory grounds to sustain vacatur, modification, or
correction; the district court denied Kyocera's request to set aside the
award. 9 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Kyocera urged that the lower court
erred in refusing to apply the contractual standard of judicial review.'
In LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (hereinafter LaPine J)96 a di-
vided panel concluded that the district court should have used the expanded
scope of review agreed to by the parties.97 The LaPine I court affirmed the
finding of the district court that statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA
were not shown, but remanded the case for consideration of the vacatur is-
sue under the standard of review set out in the parties' agreement.98 On re-
mand, the district court confirmed most of the arbitrators' award, but re-
turned the case to the arbitral panel (as a result of the district court's vacatur
of one of the panel's findings of fact) to consider whether the vacatur of this
finding would affect the arbitral award. 99 The panel responded in the nega-
tive, and the court entered judgment in favor of Prudential and LaPine."°°
Again Kyocera appealed, but again the district court was affirmed. 1 '
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted Kyocera's request for rehear-
ing en banc ("LaPine If').'0 2 In LaPine II, the court affirmed the district
court's confirmation of the arbitral award and also took the opportunity to
"correct the law regarding the proper standard for review of arbitral deci-
sions under the FAA.' ' 10 3 But, in reversing its LaPine I decision, the court in
LaPine III noted as follows:
92. Id. at 990.
93. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 991.
94. Id.
95. Id. In addition, Kyocera contended, at least summarily, that it was entitled to vacatur
pursuant to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (arbitrator exceeded their power) and 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(l) (award procured by fraud or undue means). Id. at 991.
96. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
97. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 991.
98. Id. at 992.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 993.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 994.
103. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 992 (LaPine II is an unpublished opinion; see Lapine




[W]e conclude that Congress has explicitly prescribed a much narrower
role for federal courts reviewing arbitral decisions. The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act... enumerates limited grounds on which a federal court may
vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award. Neither erroneous legal
conclusions nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify federal court re-
view of an arbitral award under the statute, which is unambiguous in this
regard. Because the Constitution reserves to Congress the power to de-
termine the standards by which federal courts render decisions, and be-
cause Congress has specified the exclusive standard by which federal
courts may review an arbitrator's decision, we hold that private parties
may not contractually impose their own standard on the courts.1
4
The court's explanation for this reversal included an explication de
texte of the FAA.'05 The court observed that, at the request of a party, "the
court must grant such an order [confirming an arbitration award,] unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11
of this title."' 6 The court emphasized that vacatur is permitted only on those
grounds set out in the FAA.'07 The court also pointed out that the modifica-
tion or correction of an award pursuant to § 11 of the FAA is merited only in
circumstances in which the award contains an evident miscalculation, where
the award was determined with respect to matters not submitted to the arbi-
trators, or where the award was imperfect in form."0 Explaining that while
these limited grounds of judicial review are among the narrowest in the law,
the court emphasized that they preserve due process and at the same time
limit unnecessary interference with the private arbitral process."' 9 The court
found the logic underlying such restrictive review to be in accord with arbi-
tration's widely proclaimed benefits of speed, economy, simplicity, and
104. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994 (emphasis added). To support vacatur under the "manifest
disregard" standard, the proponent has the difficult task of establishing that the arbitrator
knew the law and explicitly disregarded it. See Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers
of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991); Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d
891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985); Local 771, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO v. RKO General, Inc. WOR Div.,
546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 1977); San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A., v. Sague-
nay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961).
105. See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 994.
106. Id. at 997.
107. Id. Those grounds are: corruption, fraud, or undue means; partiality or corruption;
refusing to postpone, or to hear evidence, or other misbehavior; and exceeded powers. Id.
(citing French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1986), the court explained that it had previously ruled that arbitrators "exceed their powers"
only when the award is "completely irrational" and not merely when the arbitrators fail to
correctly interpret or apply the law). Id.
108. Id.
109. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998.
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finality."' Seeing the issue as one of deference to the legislative branch, the
court declared as follows:
Congress's decision to permit sophisticated parties to trade the greater
certainty of correct legal decisions by federal courts for the speed and
flexibility of arbitration determinations is a reasonable legislative judg-
ment that we have no authority to reject.'
In sum, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that by the time
an arbitration case reaches federal court, the arbitration process is com-
plete. 12 The standards specified by Congress for the confirmation of that
award must be followed, and no room remains for expansion by agreement
of private parties who are without the power to dictate the manner in which
federal courts conduct their business." 3
B. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits Endorse Contractually
Expanded Review
In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,"
4
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that agreements for expanded judi-
cial review are enforceable." 5 In 1990, MCI Telecommunications Corp. and
Gateway Technologies, Inc. entered into a subcontract agreement concern-
ing the design of a telephone system for the Virginia Department of Correc-
tions.11 6 The subcontract included a provision requiring the parties, in the
event of a dispute, to negotiate in good faith, and if that proved unsuccess-
ful, to submit to binding arbitration."7 The arbitration clause provided that
"errors of law shall be subject to appeal."'" 8 A dispute arose between MCI
and Gateway," 9 MCI terminated the contract, and the matter proceeded to
arbitration. 20 The arbitrator awarded Gateway compensatory and punitive
damages based on his finding that MCI had failed-in violation of the con-
110. Id. (citing Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8
HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 171, 171 (2003); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
111. Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998.
112. Id. at 1000.
113. Id. (citing Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249,262, n.4 (7th Cir. 2001); K & T Enters., Inc.
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Vosteen, 950 F.2d 1086,
1091 (5th Cir. 1992)).
114. 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter "Gateway").
115. Id.




120. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996.
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tract-to negotiate in good faith.121 MCI asked the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas to vacate the award, and Gateway
sought confirmation of the award. 122 The court purported to review the
award using the expanded review provided in the agreement but, in fact,
used its own harmless error standard to review alleged errors of law based
on its notion of the policy favoring arbitration. 123 It was on this basis that
the award in favor of Gateway was confirmed. 24 MCI appealed.'25
In line with what it called established principles of appellate review,
the Fifth Circuit determined that it would use a de novo standard in its ex-
amination of the district court's confirmation order. 6 The court emphasized
that in the typical case, the scope of appellate review is quite limited under
the terms of the FAA.127 It also made clear that the FAA precludes vacatur
except in specified circumstances. 128 The court, however, acknowledged the
significance of an agreement calling for a broader review than that permitted
or required by the FAA, explaining that the contractual provision that "er-
rors of law shall be subject to appeal" is consistent with the FAA's pro-
arbitration policy because arbitration, at its core, remains a "creature of con-
tract.' 29 The Gateway court found support for this conclusion in the lan-
guage of the United States Supreme Court:
"[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act it-
self. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose
of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according
to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coer-
cion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agree-






126. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938 (1995); Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994); Mcllroy
v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 819-20 (5th Cir. 1993); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil
Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1990)).
127. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (citing Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d
410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990)).
128. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1995) as the statuto-





they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under
which that arbitration will be conducted."
13
The court construed this language to include the right to dictate the scope of
review. 131
The court emphasized that the underlying purpose of the FAA is to
compel the enforcement of arbitration contracts according to their terms.'32
In particular, the court demonstrated significant reliance on language from
Volt, which construed the FAA as encompassing the right of the parties to
establish their own scope of review. 33 The court stated that "[tihere is no
federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the
federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their
terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."'34 The court held that the district
court should have reviewed the arbitrator's decision for errors of law under
a de novo standard rather than its own "harmless error standard.' ' 135 The
court explained that because the parties had expressly provided for the re-
view of errors of law by the district court, review should have been underta-
ken without regard to its wisdom because federal policy compels review in
accordance with the terms of the agreement of the parties.
136
Therefore, rather than remand the case, the Fifth Circuit undertook its
own de novo review of the arbitral award searching for "errors of law.' 37
That review led to the court's decision to affirm the award with the excep-
tion of the award for punitive damages, which was vacated based on the
court's conclusion that "as a matter of law, the facts do not sustain a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.'
'1 38
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit, in Syncor International
Corp. v. McLeland,139 declared an arbitral provision calling for expanded
review enforceable.' 4° This case arose as a result of a former employee's
130. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman, Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford; Ju-
nior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
131. Gateway, 64 F.3d at997.
132. Id. at 997 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
115 S.Ct. 834 (1995)). See Shearson-Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987) (stating that "[tlhe Arbitration Act . . . mandates enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims.").
133. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997
134. Id. n.3 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 469).
135. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997.
136. Id. (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 469).
137. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997.
138. Id. at 1000.
139. No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
140. Id. at *1.
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alleged violation of a non-competition agreement.' 4' In 1995, claiming that
former employee McLeland violated his employment agreement, Syncor
demanded arbitration pursuant to the terms of that agreement.' 42 Syncor
filed suit in federal court to compel arbitration after McLeland refused to
participate in the arbitration because he considered the dispute beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement.
43
With the matter pending in federal court, the arbitration continued
without McLeland, resulting in an award in favor of Syncor.'" The district
court, reviewing the arbitral award for evidence of the arbitrator's "manifest
disregard of the law," granted Syncor's request to enforce the award and
McLeland appealed. 45 The arbitration agreement in question provided that
"[tihe arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal
reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by judicial review for
any such error."' 46 McLeland claimed that this language required a de novo
review of the arbitration award by the district court. 47 The Fourth Circuit,
following the Fifth Circuit's holding in Gateway, concluded that the arbitra-
tor's legal findings should have been reviewed de novo. 48 The court under-
took its own de novo review and found no legal or factual error. 49
In Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser,150 the Third Circuit held
that enforcement of private arbitration agreements, including nonstatutory
vacatur provisions, was in accord with the FAA's underlying premise.'51
Roadway Package System, Inc. engaged defendant Kayser to ship packages
pursuant to a Linehaul Contractor Operating Agreement (LCOA). 52 The
LCOA included an arbitration clause with respect to its involuntary termina-
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *3.
145. McLeland, 1997 WL 452245 at *3. The arbitrator used a standard of review set
forth in Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1991) (which provides that:
an arbitrator's.. . interpretation of the law is accorded deference as well. A legal
interpretation of an arbitrator may only be overturned where it is in manifest dis-
regard of the law. An arbitration award is enforceable "even if the award resulted
from a misinterpretation of law, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous legal conclu-
sion," and may only be reversed "when arbitrators understanding correctly state
the law, but proceed to disregard the same."
Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at *6.
147. Id.
148. McLeland, 1997 WL 452245, at *6.
149. Id. at *7.
150. 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at288.
152. Id. at 288-89.
20091
UALR LAW REVIEW
tion provisions. 53 The LCOA also provided that it was to be governed by
the laws of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 4 Upon Roadway's termi-
nation of the LCOA, Kayser demanded arbitration, which resulted in a dam-
ages award in Kayser's favor of more than $174,000.' Roadway appealed
to the United States District Court, seeking vacatur or modification. 5 6 The
district court vacated the award on the grounds that the FAA, and not Penn-
sylvania law, supplied the appropriate standard of judicial review, and also
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.'57 Kayser appealed to the Third
Circuit. '58
The appellate court initially addressed the question of whether the va-
catur provisions of the FAA (as urged by Kayser) or the Pennsylvania Uni-
form Arbitration Act (PUAA) applied. 59 The court concluded that the arbi-
tral agreement involved interstate commerce and therefore found the FAA
applicable."6 The court acknowledged the four circumstances under which a
court may grant vacatur under the FAA, and provided three additional cir-
153. Id. at 289. (The arbitration clause provided in pertinent part:
"[iln the event that RPS acts to terminate this Agreement ... and [Kayser] disa-
grees with such termination ... then each such disagreement... shall be settled
by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association ....
The arbitrator shall have the authority only to conclude whether the termination
of [Kayser] was within the terms of this Agreement, to determine damages if re-
quired to do so under this subparagraph, and to provide for the division of the
expenses of the arbitration between the parties ... . If the arbitrator concludes
that the termination was not within the terms of this Agreement, then, at the op-
tion of RPS ... (2) [Kayser] shall nevertheless be terminated and ... shall be en-
titled to damages equal to the arbitrator's determination of what [Kayser's] net
earnings... would have been during the period between the date of termination
to the last day of the term of this Agreement, (without any renewals). [Kayser]
shall have no claim for damages in any other amount, and the arbitrator shall
have no power to award punitive or any other damages
The arbitrator shall have no authority to alter, amend or modify any of the terms
and conditions of this Agreement (including by application of estoppel, waiver,
or ratification), and further, the arbitrator may not enter any award which alters,
amends or modifies the terms or conditions of this Agreement in any form or
manner (including by application of estoppel, waiver, or ratification).)
154. Id. at 290.
155. Id.
156. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 291.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 291.
159. ld. at 292.
160. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995)).
Title 9, section 2 of the United States Code provides that the FAA applies to any "written
provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy arising out of such contract or transaction."
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cumstances under which a court may correct or modify an award. 16' The
court also considered the effect of the Pennsylvania arbitration law, which it
described as being divided into two categories: "statutory and common
law."' 6 2 Under Pennsylvania's "statutory arbitration" the vacatur and mod-
ification provisions are substantially similar to those found in the FAA.'63
Under "common law arbitration," the power of the courts to vacate arbitral
awards is limited to cases in which a party has been "denied a hearing or
that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition
of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award."'" Under the PUAA, all
arbitrations are presumed to be common law arbitrations unless the written
agreement expressly provides for statutory arbitration. 165 The court reasoned
that if the provisions of the PUAA were applicable, the LCOA would re-
quire common law arbitration."
The court next set out to determine whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate pursuant to the provisions of state law, rather than federal law.'
67
The court noted as follows:
When a court enforces the terms of an arbitration agreement that incor-
porates state law rules, it does so not because the parties have chosen to
be governed by state rather than federal law. Rather, it does so because
federal law requires that the court enforce the terms of the agreement. 1
68
161. Id. at 292. Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), awards are subject to vacatur on the following
bases: corruption, fraud or undue means; partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrator;
where the arbitrator unjustifiably refused to postpone the hearing or consider pertinent evi-
dence or engaged in other misbehavior to the prejudice of a party; and, where the arbitrator
exceeded the arbitrator's powers or imperfectly executed them to the extent that a mutual,
final and definite award was not made. In addition, the court identified two common law
grounds for vacatur recognized by the Third Circuit: "manifest disregard of the law" (citing
Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3rd Cir. 1990)) and "irra-
tionality" (citing Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botony Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3rd Cir.
1972)). Roadway, 257 F.3d at 292. The court also described the circumstances under which
an award may be corrected or modified by the court pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 11: a material
miscalculation, a mistake in description, or where the arbitrators have issued an award on a
matter not submitted to them. Id.at 292 n.2.
162. Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
163. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7314 (a) (vacatur) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7315
(a) (modification and correction)).
164. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 292 n.2 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7341).
165. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 292 n.2 (citing PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(a)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 292 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995) and Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (1989)). "Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)."
168. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 292 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stan-
ford, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
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The court found that parties to an arbitration agreement have the power
to agree to a scope of judicial review under a standard "borrowed from state
law" as opposed to those contained in the default provisions of the FAA.'
69
The court interpreted Volt and Mastrobuono as clarifying Southland Corp. v.
Keating170 to mean that courts must enforce the terms of arbitration agree-
ments selected by the parties, including terms by which the parties "opt out
of the FAA's off-the-rack vacatur standards" and fashion their own stan-
dards, including reference to state law.'
7'
Jacada (Europe), Ltd. (a British corporation) and International Market-
ing Strategies (IMS) (a Michigan corporation) entered into a Distribution
Agreement. 7 2 The Distribution Agreement contained: a choice of law pro-
vision (Michigan), an arbitration clause requiring arbitration by the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association in accordance with its commercial arbitration
rules, and a limited liability clause under which the maximum damages re-
coverable by IMS from all causes (other than breach of warranty) were li-
mited to amounts "actually paid by IMS to [Jacada] under the Distribution
Agreement."'73 Jacada and IMS became embroiled in a compensation dis-
pute and IMS sought arbitration. 74 The arbitrators awarded IMS damages of
more than $400,000, together with a portion of future payments due from
Jacada's customer over which the dispute arose. 175 The arbitrators declined
to abide by the liability limitation in the Distribution Agreement, finding it
to be "unreasonable and unconscionable" and "that it fails of its essential
purpose."
' 176
Jacada filed an action in Michigan state court to vacate the arbitration
award, and soon thereafter, IMS moved to enforce it in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan. 7 7 The district court
stayed its action in favor of the state court proceedings that were filed
first. 178 IMS removed the state action to federal court as falling within the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. 179 The two federal cases were consolidated, and the court held that
169. Id. at 292-93.
170. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
171. 257 F.3d at 293 n.3 (citing La Pine Tech Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888
(9th Cir. 1997)).
172. Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 703 (6th Cir.
2005).
173. Id. The choice of law provision stated that "[t]he agreement will be governed by the
laws of the State of Michigan." Id.
174. Id. at 703-04.
175. Id. at 704.
176. Id.
177. Id.




the arbitration proceeding fell within the Convention and was subject to
review under FAA standards. 8 ' On this basis, the district court upheld the
arbitral award and Jacada appealed. 18' The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
Convention did not apply and that the dispute at issue qualified as a non-
domestic dispute pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of the FAA.'82
Next, the court held that the FAA applied, inasmuch as the Distribution
Agreement is a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce"
within the ambit of 9 U.S.C.A. § 2.183 The court then addressed the issue of
the applicable standard of review: the limited scope found under the FAA or
the broader one under Michigan law.' 84 The court read Mastrobuono and
Volt as declaring the primary purpose of the FAA to be to compel the en-
forcement of private arbitral agreements according to their terms.'
85
The most recent case in which a circuit court of appeals took the oppor-
tunity to examine the enforceability of expanded scopes of review estab-
lished by contract was Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc. (PRTC) v. U.S.
Phone Manufacturing Corp. (USP). 186 There, USP agreed to supply tele-
phones to PRTC under a requirements contract which provided that it was to
be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 87 The con-
tract contained an arbitration clause, which provided in pertinent part:
[d]isputes shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Ar-
bitration of the American Arbitration Association .... The panel shall
meet in Puerto Rico and apply the law of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico .... The arbitral award shall be substantiated in writing and the
findings shall be final and binding for both parties.
188
Disputes arose between PRTC and USP resulting in a contract termina-
tion by PRTC and the subsequent commencement of arbitration by USP.
189
An arbitral panel awarded USP more than $2,500,000.' 9 PRTC moved to
vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court, contending
that, under the contract, the court's review of the arbitral award was not li-
mited to the scope of review set out in the FAA, but was rather subject to
review for errors of law.' 9' The district court, applying the scope of review
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 708-09.
183. Id. at 709.
184. Jacada Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc.,, 401 F.3d 701, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2005).
185. Id. at710.
186. 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
187. Id. at 23.
188. Id.





set out in the FAA, denied PRTC's motion to vacate, finding that the facts
did "not rise to anywhere near the level required under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act in order to allow court review... [and] that PRTC's objections to
the arbitration are essentially disagreements with the arbitrators' conclu-
sion. ' '
On appeal by PRTC, the First Circuit noted that the parties were in
agreement that the contract was governed by the FAA under which review is
quite limited. 193 The court pointed out that section 10 of the FAA "carefully
limits judicial intervention to instances where the arbitration has been
tainted in certain specific ways.. . [and] contains no express grounds upon
which an award can be overturned because it rests on garden-variety factual
or legal [errors]."' 94 Nevertheless, PRTC urged that by designating the ap-
plicability of Puerto Rican law, the parties had contracted for a scope of
review broader than provided by the FAA. 95 The court found the circums-
tances at hand to be similar to those in Mastrobuono, in which the court held
that the choice of law provision in that case could not be interpreted as in-
tent to "substitute state for federal law.',
196
In Mastrobuono, the arbitral clause provided for the applicability of
National Association of Securities Dealers rules, which allowed awards of
punitive damages. 197 The same contract, however, provided that it was to be
governed by the law of New York, which did not permit an award of puni-
tive damages by arbitrators.' 98 In Mastrobuono, the court held that a choice
of law provision alone will not suffice to restrict the arbitrators' authority by
application of state law in light of the fact that such choice of law provision
conflicted with the arbitral provision."9 The court held that a generic choice
of law provision would not suffice to supplant the strong federal policy es-
tablished by the FAA of limited judicial review of arbitral awards. 200 The
court made clear that the contract language in question was insufficient to
establish a scope of review broader than that provided in the FAA, but clari-
fied that parties by contract can expand the FAA's standard of review.2°'
192. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21,24 (1st Cir. 2005).
193. Id. at 25.
194. Id. (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). See Wonder-
land Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 274 F.3d 34, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
that awards may be vacated for legal error under the FAA only in manifest disregard of the
law).
195. Id. at 26.
196. Id. at27 (citing Mastrobouno, 514 U.S. at 58-61).
197. Id. at 27-28 (citing Mastrobouno, 514 U.S. at 60-61).
198. Puerto Rico Tel.Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 28 (citing Mastrobouno, 514 U.S. at 63-64).
200. Id. at 29 (citing PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1996)).
201. Id. at 31 (citing Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701,
711 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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The First Circuit emphasized its rejection of the Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion that a contractual agreement to a standard of review different than that
set out by the FAA somehow violates the rule precluding parties from creat-
ing federal jurisdiction by private agreement.202 The court considered this
position "misplaced" because federal jurisdiction, in cases to compel arbitra-
tion or to enforce or vacate arbitral awards, requires diversity or another
grant of jurisdiction.2 3
The First Circuit also rejected the conclusions of the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits in Kyocera (LaPine III) and Bowen that "[b]road judicial review of
arbitration decisions could well jeopardize the very benefits of arbitration,
rendering informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and
time-consuming judicial review process. ' 2° Instead, the court favored its
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's proclamation that Con-
gress's "preeminent concern in passing the Act. . . [was] to enforce private
agreements, ' 205 and the recognition in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.2°6 that sometimes agreements of the parties
might "require [] piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement." 27
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT: HALL STREETASSOCIATES, L.L.C. v. MATTEL,
INC.
A. The Background
The genesis of this litigation was a real estate lease entered into be-
tween lessor Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. (Hall Street) and lessee Mattel,
Inc. (Mattel).0 8 Hall Street sued Mattel claiming a right of indemnity from
Mattel with respect to claims resulting from water pollution on the leased
premises.2 Mattel removed the case to the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon under diversity jurisdiction."0 The district court con-
202. Id. at 30 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987,
994 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
203. Id. at 30-31. The court recognized the FAA as creating federal substantive law but
not creating independent federal jurisdiction. Id. at 31 n.7 (citations omitted).
204. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)
(quoting Kyocera, 341F.3d at 998).
205. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).).
206. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
207. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 31 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983)).
208. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
209. Id. at 1400.




ducted a bench trial, limited to the issue of Mattel's lease termination, which
ended in favor of Mattel.2 ' With court approval, the parties agreed to arbi-
trate the remaining issues under an agreement, which provided that:
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacat-
ing, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify
or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclu-
212sions of law are erroneous.
Based on an exception to the indemnity obligation contained in the
lease, the arbitrator ruled that Mattel was not required to indemnify Hall
Street.213 The arbitrator concluded that Mattel had not violated a provision in
the lease requiring it to comply with environmental law, which the arbitrator
determined did not include the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (the
"Oregon Act").214 Pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement ap-
proved by the district court, Hall Street sought review of the arbitrator's
legal conclusion that Mattel's violation of the Oregon Act did not constitute
a violation of "applicable environmental law" within the terms of the
lease. 2'5 The district court rejected the arbitrator's conclusion in this regard
and remanded the matter to the arbitrator for additional consideration.1 6
The arbitrator entered an amended award in favor of Hall Street based upon
the legal conclusion that the Oregon Act was an "applicable environmental
law" pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement.217 Both parties sought
modification of the award, and applying the agreed standard of review for
legal error, the district court corrected the arbitrator's interest calculation but
otherwise upheld the amended award in favor of Hall Street.
218
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Mattel "switched horses" and argued
(wisely, as it turned out) that the district court erred in reviewing de novo
the arbitrator's conclusions of law in light of that court's November 2004
decision in Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services., Inc.,219 in which
the court declared an arbitral provision providing for review beyond that set
211. Hall Street, 128 S.Ct. at 1400.
212. Id. at 1400-01.
213. Id. at 1401.
214. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
215. Id. (providing review for legal error in accordance with the parties' agreement, the
district court relied on the holding of the Ninth Circuit in LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997)).
216. Id. at 1401.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir.2003).
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out in the FAA to be unenforceable. 220 The court of appeals in Hall Street
reversed the vacatur and remanded the case with instructions that the district
court should confirm the original award in favor of Mattel unless it deter-
mined that the award should be vacated or modified on one of the grounds
permitted by the FAA.22' Dauntless, the district court again held for Hall
Street, this time finding grounds for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10 based on its
conclusion that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by implausibly interpret-
ing the lease.222 That decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, which con-
cluded that neither § 10 nor § 11 include "implausibility" as one of the
grounds for vacatur or modification of an arbitral award.223 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the bases for va-
catur and modification established by the FAA are exclusive.224
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, found the FAA's grounds for
vacatur and modification of arbitral awards exclusive and not subject to ex-
pansion by private agreement.225 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Alito joined the majority opinion.226 Justice Scalia also joined
the majority opinion, with the exception of footnote seven. 227 At the outset,
the Court acknowledged the split between the circuits as to whether the sta-
tutory grounds for vacatur and modification established by the FAA are sub-
ject to contractual expansion and noted that the majority of the circuits that
have addressed the issue have answered in the affirmative.228




224. Id. at 1400.
225. Id. at 1400. In order to limit the issue to the scope of judicial review permissible
under the FAA (rather than the creation of federal jurisdiction by private contract) Justice
Souter pointed out that the FAA creates no federal jurisdiction but its application requires an
independent jurisdictional basis. Id. at 1402 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
226. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1399 (2008).
227. Id. at n.7. (setting out the legislative history of the FAA).
228. Id. at 1403. The Court noted that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have established that
the FAA's grounds for review are exclusive and not subject to expansion by contract (citing
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003);
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001)). The Court further noted
that the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held to the contrary (citing Puerto Rico
Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v.
Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommu-
nications Corp., 60 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995)). Id. n.5.
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The majority opinion focused on the explication of statutory text in
reaching its decision. In particular, the Court focused on the language of
section 9 of the FAA to buttress the conclusion that an arbitral award must
be confirmed unless vacated, modified, or corrected pursuant to the provi-
sions of sections 10 and 11 229 For the majority, the principal point was the
mandatory language of section 9 that the Court "must grant" the order of
confirmation "unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as pre-
scribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title., 230 The majority considered this
language inflexible, requiring mandatory confirmation in every situation
unless one of the delineated exceptions was found applicable and teaching
that such mandatory language could not withstand the transformation into a
mere default provision for use only in the event the parties fail to provide
otherwise.23 ' By way of illustration, the Court cited §5 as an example of the
manner in which Congress could, and did, create a default provision:
[I]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or ap-
pointing an arbitrator ... such method shall be followed: but if no me-
thod be provided therein, or if a method be provided and if any party the-
reto shall fail to avail himself of such method, . . . then upon the applica-
tion of either part2 to controversy the court shall designate and appoint
an arbitrator ....
The majority stressed that the bases for modification and vacatur set
out in sections 10 and 1 1 of the FAA are of the same class: extreme depar-
tures from the parties' agreement making the doctrine of ejusdem generis
applicable.233 Here, the FAA lists a specific basis for vacatur or modification
followed by no language of expansion and as such, that language cannot be
considered authorization sufficient to permit contracts for judicial reviews of
"any legal error.' 234
Justice Souter, departing slightly from the task of statutory construc-
tion, dismissed the assertion that the FAA's primary aim is to enforce pri-
vate arbitral agreements, and identified the principal question as whether the
text of the FAA is contrary to the notion of enforcing a private agreement
for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards. 235 He said it makes sense to
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1405.
231. Id.
232. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008).
233. Id. at 1404-05. Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction, where an enumera-
tion is followed by general words, the general words are to be held as applying only to the
same class as those specifically enumerated, rather than broadly construed. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 608 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
234. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.(J. Souter) (noting that "'[flraud' and a mistake of law
are not cut from the same cloth.").
235. Id. at 1404 (see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
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view sections 9 through 11 as the embodiment of a national policy favoring
arbitration and having as one part of that favored treatment, the provision for
limited review in order to maintain arbitration's "essential virtue of resolv-
ing disputes straightaway," as opposed to the reading urged by Hall Street,
which would put arbitration in the posture of a mere prelude to the judicial
process.236
Hall Street relied on comments in Wilco v. Swan237 (in reference to sec-
tion 10 of the FAA) that "[p]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is li-
mited" and that "the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast
to manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation., 23 Hall Street argued that this
language recognizes "manifest disregard of the law" as a ground for vacatur
in addition to those specifically listed in section 10 of the FAA.239 This read-
ing by Hall Street is in accord with several circuits24 but was rejected by the
Supreme Court. 24'
The Court also rejected Hall Street's contention that Wilco supported
the conclusion that the FAA's grounds for vacatur or modification are not
exclusive, finding Wilco was limited to the determination that section 14 of
the Securities Act of 1933 voided agreements to arbitrate violations of that
Act.2 42 In the Court's view, the Wilco statements reject the general review
of arbitral legal errors and the vagueness of Wilco's phrasing leads to sever-
al possible interpretations (other than that of adding a ground for vacatur)
including a mere reference to the section 10 grounds collectively.243 Alterna-
tively, Justice Souter pointed out that perhaps the "manifest disregard" lan-
guage in Wilco could have been a "shorthand" reference to the grounds for
vacatur set out in section 10(a)(3) (misconduct) or section 10(a)(4) (powers
exceeded).2'
236. Id. at 1405 (citing Kyocera, 341 F.3d, at 998; cf Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers
of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)).
237. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
238. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008) (quoting Wilco,
346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953)).
239. Id.
240. See e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Markets., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (st Cir.
2006); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Prestige Ford v. Computer
Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-396 (5th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d
1007, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1998).
241. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
242. Id. at 1403.
243. Id. (see e.g.,Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 656 (1985) (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
244. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008) (See e.g., Kyo-
cera, 34 F.3d at 997).
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The majority also rejected Hall Street's reliance on the language in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd245 "reject[ing] the suggestion that the
overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims."'  The majority characterized this as only an attempt to explain that
problems associated with simultaneously conducting arbitration and federal
court litigation are an insufficient reason to defer arbitration. 24'
In passing, the Court acknowledged the juxtaposition of the policy ar-
guments of Hall Street and its amici curiae, which stated that parties will
shun arbitration absent the availability of expanded review,248 with the con-
tention of Mattel's amicus curiae that parties will flee the courts if expanded
review is available. 249 Nevertheless, Justice Souter stressed that, given the
text of the FAA, the Court had "no business to expand the statutory
grounds., 25" Near the end of the majority opinion, Justice Souter pointed out
the following:
In holding that [sections] 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the
review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they ex-
clude more searching review based on authority outside of the statute as
well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review
of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under statutory
or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is
arguable. But here we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial
review under [sections] 9, 10 and 11 deciding nothing about other possi-
ble aspects for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.
251
With that, the Court pronounced that the FAA limits judicial review to the
grounds listed in sections 10 and 11, vacated the judgment, and remanded
for proceedings consistent with the opinion.252
245. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
246. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at
219).
247. Id. at 1405-1406 (explaining Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985)).
248. Id. at 1406 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 39; Brief for New England Legal Founda-
tion, et al. as amici curiae at 15).
249. Id. (citing Brief for U.S. Counsel for Int'l Bus. as amicus curiae at 29-30).
250. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).
251. Id.
252. Id., 128 S. Ct. at 1408. The Court declined to consider the issues in any context other
than that of the FAA on the grounds that no other basis was argued; the parties had the FAA
in mind at the outset; the district court thought it was applying the FAA by alluding to it in its
quotation of LaPine I; and the Ninth Circuit apparently thought that the district court review
of the arbitral award depended on the FAA; and, in the petition and primary briefs, the parties
acted on the same premise. Id. at 1406-07. In addition, at the conclusion of the majority
opinion, the Court noted that since the arbitral agreement was entered into during the litiga-
tion process and submitted to the trial court for approval, the case could be analyzed as an
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C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennedy
joined. 253 Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent.2 4 In his dissent, Justice
Stevens chastised the majority for forbidding the enforcement of "perfectly
reasonable judicial review provisions in arbitration agreements fairly nego-
tiated by the parties and approved by the district court," in direct conflict
with Congress's aim of reversing long-standing reluctance to enforce arbi-
tration agreements. 5 Justice Stevens, after reviewing the judiciary's histori-
cal enmity toward the enforcement of arbitration agreements, noted that,
prior to the enactment of the FAA, the courts rarely deigned to enforce
them.256 He declared this purpose "stronger today than before the FAA was
enacted" and noted that it provided more reason than ever to give judicial
effect to agreements that allow judicial review beyond that provided by the
FAA.257 Justice Stevens characterized the bases for the majority decision as
follows: (1) expedited federal enforcement of arbitration awards is condi-
tioned upon the FAA's limitations on judicial review, and (2) Congress in-
tended to qualify the list of the grounds for vacatur and modification set out
in 9 U.S.C. § 10 and § 11 with the phrase "and no other. 25' To him, these
positions were untenable: "An unnecessary refusal to enforce a perfectly
reasonable category of arbitration agreements defeats the primary purpose of
the statute.,
259
With respect to the first, he argued that the FAA is premised on Con-
gress's assumption that arbitration is quicker and cheaper than litigation, and
as such, the FAA should be construed to encourage the use of arbitration. °
In the view of Justices Steven's and Kennedy's dissent, the FAA's primary
purpose is defeated upon the judiciary's refusal to enforce an entire class of
exercise of the trial court's authority to manage cases under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 1407-08. The Court, however, declined to address that issue, other
than to leave it open for pursuit by Hall Street on remand: "If the Court of Appeals finds they
are open, the court may consider whether the District Court's authority to manage litigation
independently warranted that court's order on the mode of resolving the indemnification
issues remaining in this case." Id. at 1407-08.
253. Id. at 1408.
254. Id. at 1410.
255. Id. at 1408. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984)).
256. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008) (see Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924)); Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten v.
Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet, 252 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1920).
257. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1408.





"perfectly reasonable" agreements.2 ' In addition, the goal of encouraging
the use of arbitration "provides a sufficient response to the Court's reliance
on statutory text., 262 This dissent denigrated the approach taken by the ma-
jority as "a wooden application" of the rule of ejusdem generis and that the
specifically enumerated grounds for vacatur and modification amount only
to a floor-those "that must always be available.,
263
Justice Stevens also found it important that prior to the FAA's passage
in 1925, judicial review of arbitration awards was thorough, broad, and, in
fact, hostile. 2' 4 This historical context, viewed in light of the purposes of the
FAA, led the dissent to the conclusion that the vacatur and modification
provisions of the FAA set out in sections 10 and 11 are intended "as a shield
meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut
261. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008).
262. Id. at 1409.
263. Id. at 1409. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006) provides in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration ... then at any time
within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to
the court ... for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must
grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as pre-
scribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) provides:
(a) In any of the following cases, the United States Court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-(1) where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or cor-
ruption in the arbitrators or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown,
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000), provides in pertinent part:
In either of the following cases, the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-(a) Where there was
an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in
the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. (b)
Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless
it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
264. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1408 n.1 (see Klein v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732, 735 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814) and 1409 n.3 (see also Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Feder-
al Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 270-71 (1926); Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an




down parties' 'valid, irrevocable and enforceable' agreements to arbitrate
their disputes subject to judicial review for errors of law. ' 265 The penulti-
mate paragraph of the dissent focused on extant policy issues and found
them compelling:
Even if I thought the narrow issue presented in this case were as debata-
ble as the conflict among the courts of appeals suggests, I would rely on
a presumption of overriding importance to resolve the debate and rule in
favor of petitioner's position that the FAA permits the statutory grounds
for vacatur and modification of an award to be supplemented by contract.
A decision "not to regulate" the terms of an agreement that does not
even arguably offend any public policy whatsoever, "is adequately justi-




In his dissent, Justice Breyer characterized the issue as whether the
FAA precludes federal courts from enforcing agreements that give the court
the authority to set aside an arbitration award on account of a mistake of
law.267 Justice Breyer agreed that the provisions of the FAA do not preclude
judicial enforcement of such agreements. 268 The purpose of the dissent was
to point out his conclusion that the case should be remanded with instruc-
tions that the Ninth Circuit should affirm the judgment of the district court
enforcing the arbitrator's final award.269
D. The Role of Legislative History: Footnote 7
In footnote 7 of the majority opinion, Justice Souter laid out the legisla-
tive history of the FAA, finding it consistent with the majority's conclusion
that the statutory text "gives us no business to expand the statutory
grounds. 27° It was first noted that the FAA is textually based on the New
York arbitration statute.27' Justice Souter went on to explain that New
York's arbitration statute incorporated the New York Code of Civil Proce-
265. Id. at 1408 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
266. Id. 1409-10 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320
(1993) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
267. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1410 (2008).
268. Id. at 1410 (quoting, with approval, from the opinion of the Court that the FAA "is
not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards" and Justice
Stevens's dissent that the FAA is a "shield meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a
sword with which to cut down parties' 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' agreements to
arbitrate their disputes subject to judicial review for errors of law."). Id. at 1409 & n. 3.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1406. Interestingly, this is the only portion of the majority opinion with which
Justice Scalia did not join, and one would assume it was placed in a footnote for his conveni-
ence in that regard.
271. Id. n.7. (see S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924)).
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dure, which mandated that the court grant an application for confirmation
"unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected, as prescribed in the
next two sections," which were noted to be "virtually identical" to sections
10 and 11 of the FAA.272 The majority also found significant a portion of the
brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen, a primary drafter of the 1920 New
York Act and the FAA. Cohen wrote, "[t]he grounds for vacating, modify-
ing or correcting an award are limited. If the award [meets a condition of §
10], then and then only the award may be vacated .... If there was [an error
under § 11], then and then only it may be modified or corrected .... ,,273 in
addition, the House Report provided that an "award may... be entered as a
judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption and
similar undue influence, or for palpable error in form. 274 Justice Souter em-
phasized that this provision of the FAA, based upon the New York arbitra-
tion law, was distinct from that of the Illinois Arbitration and Awards Act of
1917 requiring, upon request of either party, the submission of legal ques-
tions during the arbitration to judicial determination.275
V. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
With little more than passing reference to the policy issues and the ef-
fect on the continued efficacy of arbitration, the United States Supreme
Court chose to rely on canons of statutory construction in concluding that
the FAA provides the sole grounds for vacatur and modification. Rejecting
what it called this "wooden application of the old rule of ejusdem generis"
as contrary to the FAA's core purpose of enforcing arbitration contracts as
written, the dissent characterized the Court's decision as "forbid[ing] en-
forcement of perfectly reasonable judicial review provisions in arbitration
agreements fairly negotiated by the parties" and, in so doing, disregarding
the historical context in which Congress passed the FAA in 1925.276
Nevertheless, the course of arbitration after this decision is of signifi-
cant concern to those who use arbitration. Hall Street and its amici urged
that allowing the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification set forth in
the FAA to be supplemented by contract-in addition to being permitted
textually-constitutes good public policy for several reasons. First, the sig-
272. Id. (see 1920 N.Y. Laws page no. 806 and 2 N.Y. REP,. ANN. CODE CIv. PROC. §§
2374-75 (Stover 6th ed. 1902)).
273. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 n.7 (2008) (quoting
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of
the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 34 (1924)).
274. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924)).
275. Id. (citing Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings 97-98 (1924); 1917 11. Laws page no. 203)).
276. Id. at 1408.
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nificance of the issues and the amount of money involved may make some
disputants reluctant to trade reliable decision making and legal certainty for
simplicity, speed, and economy; good policy would not require that such
parties be limited to only two choices-litigation or arbitration without the
possibility of judicial review-to ensure legal correctness. 277 Second, effi-
ciency favors review for legal error requiring fewer resources than full adju-
dication, thereby reducing the burden on the judiciary, while at the same
time increasing the number of parties who would be amenable to arbitration,
given the option for meaningful judicial review.278 In Hall Street's view, the
policy considerations favor the enforcement of arbitral agreements provid-
ing for enhanced judicial review because these agreements effectuate the
parties' contractual rights and expectations, encourage arbitration by afford-
ing flexibility and protection against legally erroneous awards, reduce the
burden on the judicial system, and augment the overarching policy of the
FAA.
279
Mattel claimed the public policy high ground just as vigorously, ar-
guing that expanded review would result in chaos, destroy the arbitration
process as we know it, and wreak havoc for both arbitrators and the
courts. 280 The potential for review of arbitrators' legal and factual errors
would, according to Mattel, require the transformation of the arbitration
process into something indistinguishable from litigation, resulting in bur-
dens that would undermine the time and cost savings so central to that alter-
native. 281 Even worse, if expansive judicial review was allowed and the arbi-
tral process remained unchanged, the resulting review for legal and factual
error-with few rules and no detailed decision making-would inevitably
lead to wasteful remands to the arbitrator for more detailed explanations and
findings, again in contravention with the FAA's primary goal of finality.282
All of this, according to Mattel, would make arbitration a mere prelude to
litigation of no particular benefit to the ultimate judicial decision maker.283
277. Brief for the Petitioner at 38-39, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
278. Brief for the Petitioner at 40, Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008) (No. 06-989).
279. Id.
280. Brief for Respondent at 44, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 45.
283. Id. at 47. Many of the parties' policy arguments were bolstered by amici. The Amer-
ican Arbitration Association (AAA) and the United States Council for International Business,
filed amicus briefs in support of Mattel. The Wireless Association, New England Legal
Foundation, et al. and the Pacific Legal Foundation filed amicus briefs on behalf of Hall
Street. The AAA made several points in support of Mattel, as follows: (1) Congressional
intent in establishing the FAA's system of arbitration with its emphasis on finality would be
frustrated by contractually expanded judicial review (Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association in Support of Affirmance, supra note 12, at 8); (2), allowing
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In addition to Hall Street's admittedly unknown potential secondary ef-
fects on the practice of arbitration, there are two other significant questions
left unanswered by the decision: (1) the status of the common law grounds
for vacatur and (2) whether arbitral parties can require arbitrators to adhere
to substantive legal norms, backed up by judicial enforcement. The statutory
grounds for vacatur under the FAA have been supplemented by judicially
crafted grounds established, to a greater or lesser extent, in each of the cir-
cuits, including provision for the vacatur of awards found to be in manifest
disregard of the law, contrary to public policy, irrational, or arbitrary and
capricious. 284 The continued viability of these common law grounds that do
not fit within the FAA's statutory framework has been called into question
expanded review threatens to turn to a purely advisory process, denying the promise of a
timely, less expensive, and final determination of disputes (Brief of amicus Curiae American
Arbitration Association in Support of Affirmance, supra note 12, at 21-23); (3) arbitral par-
ties are free to incorporate an appellate review process within the arbitration system (Brief of
Amicus Curiae American Arbitration Association in Support of Affirmance, supra note 12,
at 22-23), and (4) expanded judicial review would be contrary to the understanding and prac-
tice of arbitration by most of the international community (Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Arbitration Association in Support of Affirmance, supra note 12, at 24-27.
The United States Council for International Business as amicus curiae in support of
Respondent pointed out that expanded judicial review would make the United States less
attractive as a forum for international arbitration. Brief for United States Council for Interna-
tional Business as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent, supra note 12, at 28-30. Amici
for Hall Street focused on the chilling effect precluding expanded judicial review would have
on the use of arbitration. The Wireless Association contended that the denial of the right to
the enforcement of contractual agreements to expand the grounds for review would under-
mine the willingness of some parties to participate in arbitration, adding to the workload of
the courts. Brief of CTIA - Wireless Association (R) as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 6-8. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-989).
The New England Legal Foundation and National Federation of Independent Business Foun-
dation focused on the fact that the FAA's limited standard of review exposes participants in
arbitration to legally erroneous, yet unreviewable, arbitration decisions. Brief of Amici Cu-
riae New England Legal Foundation and National Federation of Independent Business Legal
Foundation in Support of Petitioner on the Merits at 13-16, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No.
06-989) (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex-Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Compa-
nies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335 (2007); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbi-
tration Awards, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 171 (2003); Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review
to Correct Arbitral Error-An Option to Consider, 13 OYHo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 103 (1997);
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build it, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Liti-
gation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579 (2007)). It was the position
of Hall Street's amici that this risk would cause arbitration to be avoided, while the freedom
to contract for expanded judicial review would foster additional reliance on arbitration and at
the same time reduce the judiciary's caseload. Brief of the New England Legal Foundation
and National Federation of Independent Business Foundation as amicus curiae in Support of
Petitioner on the Merits at 13-16, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989).
284. Lawrence R. Mills, J. Lani Bader, Thomas J. Brewer & Peggy J. Williams, Vacating
Arbitration Awards, Disp. RESOL MAG., Summer 2005, at 23.
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by Hall Street.285 Another unanswered question is whether parties can, by
agreement, require their arbitrator to adhere to substantive legal norms or
285. To support vacatur under the manifest disregard standard, the proponent has the
difficult task of establishing that the arbitrator knew the law and explicitly disregarded it.
Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.
1991); Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985); Local 771, I.A.T.S.E.,
AFL-CIO v. RKO Gen., Inc. WOR Div., 546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 1977); San Martine
Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir.
1961). See also Stanley A. Leasure, Vacatur of Arbitration Awards: The Poor Loser Problem
or Loser Pays? 29 U. ARK. L1TrLE ROCK L. REV. 512 (2007). While manifest disregard is a
judicially created ground for vacatur, a number of cases have considered it as one example of
a circumstance in which an arbitrator can be considered to have exceeded the arbitrator's
powers, thereby falling within the scope of section 10 (a)(4) of the FAA. Upshur Coals
Corp., 933 F.2d at 229. Accordingly, it would appear that conduct constituting manifest
disregard of the law could be incorporated under the Hall Street decision, as within the ambit
of the FAA as a statutory basis for vacatur.
Subsequent to the Hall Street decision, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division in Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. NL
Industries, 553 F. Supp.2d 733, 753 (2008), following this logic, ruled that:
Because the Supreme Court did not expressly decide whether the 'manifest dis-
regard' standard remains a separate basis for federal court review of arbitration
decisions in at least some circumstances; because the Fifth Circuit has often ap-
proved of reviewing arbitration awards for 'manifest disregard,'; and because
Halliburton sought vacatur on the basis of the Fifth Circuit's 'manifest disregard'
standard, out of an abundance of caution this court analyzes the parties' argu-
ments using 'manifest disregard' as both a summary of some of the statutory
grounds and as an additional ground for vacatur."
Id. at 752 (citation omitted).
See also Chase Bank USA, NA v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2008) in which the
court noted:
The Supreme Court has now announced, however, that section 10 of the FAA
provides the exclusive route for expedited judicial vacatur of an arbitral award
under the federal statutory scheme. (citation omitted). The Court examined the
"manifest disregard" standard of the Wilco Court for the first time, and found the
concept ambiguous ....
Although the Court in Hall Street did not settle on its own definition of the term,
it rejected the notion that "manifest disregard" embodies a separate, non-
statutory ground for judicial review under the FAA. Nonetheless, by favorably
citing the above-quoted language from its earlier decision in Kaplan, supra, the
Hall Street Court appears to have done nothing to jettison the "manifest disre-
gard" standard of Wilco. Accordingly, this court will view "manifest disregard of
law" as judicial interpretation of the section 10 requirement, rather than as a sep-
arate standard of review. It seems appropriate, however, since the standard has
apparently not been overruled by the Court, to resort to existing case law to de-
termine its contours.
(citations omitted). On the other hand, the First Circuit, in dicta, has indicated that Hall
Street vitiates manifest disregard of the law as a valid ground for vacatur or modification
under the FAA. Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008). The other com-
mon law grounds for vacatur-violation of public policy, irrationality, and arbi-
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have the decision judicially set aside as beyond the scope of the arbitrator's
powers. In an opinion issued before the Hall Street decision, the Seventh
Circuit indicated that, regardless of the holding in Hall Street, the answer to
this question may be in the affirmative." 6
The potential reach of Hall Street's holding is another open issue.
Some may attempt to marginalize the decision in Hall Street as of limited
effect, given the language in the opinion that statutory or common law bases
for expanded judicial review outside the FAA may be "arguable ' 28 7 and that
the holding is strictly limited to circumstances in which expedited relief
under sections 10 and 11 of the FAA is sought. While this is true from a
technical standpoint, the problem is that there is uncertainty as to what, if
any, other statutory or common law bases are extant and the means available
to access them. In this case much was made of the inherent authority of the
district court to mange its docket and that trial court orders approving arbi-
tration and establishing expanded review within the context of the underly-
ing federal case could be such a means to this end.288 This mechanism, how-
ever, would, by definition, be available only with respect to arbitral agree-
ments arising in the course of the federal litigation and not with regard to
pre-dispute agreements.
Another potential source mentioned is state arbitration law. Unfortu-
nately, this would raise a number of unresolved issues as well, including
selection of applicable law, given that the Uniform Arbitration Act and Re-
vised Uniform Arbitration Act-the models for many state arbitration sta-
tutes-have no provision for expanded judicial review. Further, the issues of
preemption by the FAA would likely arise in this context. In any event,
those intrepid enough to take Justice Souter's invitation to try to develop a
means for expanded review outside the FAA can hardly do so with any con-
fidence that whatever alternative they select will be sufficiently developed
trary/capricious-will be more difficult to place within the rubric of the FAA and after Hall
Street, may be of no moment.
286. The Seventh Circuit, in Edstrom Industries, Inc. v. Companion Life Insurance Co.,
516 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2008), noted:
The question in our case is different. It is whether the arbitrator can be directed
to apply specific substantive norms and held to the application. The Supreme
Court held in the Volt case, that parties to a contract may include in the contract's
arbitration clause a choice of law provision defining, by reference to a state's ar-
bitration law (provided it does not undermine the federal arbitration law), 'the
rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.' We cannot think of any
reason why the choice of law provision could not designate the governing subs-
tantive norms. The alternative would leave every arbitrator free to make up his
own law of contracts.
(citations omitted).
287. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405-06 (2008).
288. Id. at 1407-08.
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to avoid protracted post-arbitration litigation substantially similar to that
experienced by Hall Street and Mattel.289 The potential for other avenues
suggested by the majority may turn out to be nothing more than whimsical
dead ends as opposed to significant limitations on the practical reach of Hall
Street.
The Hall Street majority felt the text of the statute left little, if any,
room for consideration of such policy issues or the effect of its decision on
the continued willingness of commercial enterprises to contract for dispute
resolution arbitration without the option for meaningful judicial review.290 In
fact, the majority conceded that it could not predict the practical effect of its
ruling.29' This is, however, not the first time the United States Supreme
Court has been required to construe the text of the FAA, and on many such
prior occasions, the Court did not find itself so constrained to hew solely to
the maxims of statutory construction, without consideration of the broader
issues of policy or legislative intent. In fact, in his book, Active Liberty:
Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Justice Breyer, one of the Hall
Street dissenters, described the method of contextual statutory construction
to determine legislative intent as a "purposive" approach.292 In his view, it
behooves the Court to identify legislative intent by the best means availa-
ble293 rather than relying in excess on the statutory text, which "can lead
courts astray, divorcing law from life[,] ... [although] a purposive approach
is more consistent with the framework for a 'delegated democracy' that the
Constitution creates. 294 Using, for demonstrative purposes, a case under the
FAA, Justice Breyer explained the potentially outcome-determinative effect
of the choice between the purposive and textual approaches. His illustration
centered on the issue of the exception from the scope of the FAA all of
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" and whether "any
other class of workers" encompasses all other employees or only those con-
nected with maritime or railroad employment.295 Justice Breyer noted that
the Court majority, using a textual interpretive approach and applying the
289. See generally, S.M. Widman & Michael Garone & Thomas Stipanowich, Hall Street
v. Mattel: The Federal Arbitration Act's Grounds of Review are Preserved-Or are They?
and related program, The Arbitration Committee of the Dispute Resolution Section and the
ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education (July 30, 2008).
290. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
291. Id.
292. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
89 (2005); see also Carol J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determination of Public
Use and Eminent Domain in Economic Development under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. Rev.
43, 54-56 (2006).
293. BREYER, supra note 292, at 99.
294. BREYER, supra note 292, at 81.
295. BREYER, supra note 292, at 87-88.
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doctrine of ejusdem generis, found that the statutory language in question
included only those connected with maritime or railroad employment. 296 To
make his point, Justice Breyer noted that the dissent, utilizing a purposive
approach, examined the legislative history of the FAA to determine why the
Congress had excluded any employees from the coverage of the FAA and
found that the genesis of this exclusion was opposition from the seamen's
union, which opposed the FAA's enactment on the grounds that employ-
ment arbitration would disadvantage workers. 297 An officer of the American
Bar Association (ABA), a major proponent of the FAA, testified before a
congressional committee that the ABA was only interested in arbitration of
commercial disputes, not those involving employment and that to assuage
the concerns of the seamen's union, language should be added excluding
"seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce. 298
According to Justice Breyer, the purposive approach utilized by the dissent
led to the inescapable conclusion that Congress would have wanted the ex-
clusion applicable to all workers, contrary to the conclusion reached by the
majority of the Court in the case using a textual approach.299 The lesson
learned from this example, at least according to Justice Breyer, is that a
purely textual approach (such as that used by the majority in Hall Street) can
lead to a result contrary to that envisioned by the legislative branch.300
While not necessarily identifying the methodology as "purposive," the
Supreme Court has frequently relied on the strong national policy favoring
arbitration and the manner in which Congress advanced that policy by man-
dating the enforcement of arbitral agreements. 0 Public policy was identi-
fied as one of the primary bases for the Court's conclusion that Congress, in
passing the FAA, exercised its power under the Commerce Clause to with-
draw from the states the ability to require parties to litigate claims they had
contracted to arbitrate. °2 When faced with a particularly knotty problem of
statutory construction under the FAA-the scope of the applicability of the
FAA vis-A-vis the states-the Court emphasized the significance of the
FAA's underlying policy concerns:
We therefore proceed to the basic interpretive questions aware that we
are interpreting an Act that seeks broadly to overcome judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements and that applies in both federal and state courts.
296. BREYER, supra note 292, at 88.
297. BREYER, supra note 292, at 89.
298. BREYER, supra note 292, at 89.
299. BREYER, supra note 292, at 90-91.
300. BREYER, supra note 292, at 94.
301. See e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995); Moses H.
Cohn Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395,404 (1967).
302. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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We must decide in this case whether that Act used language about inter-
state commerce that nonetheless limits the Act's application, thereby
carving out an important statutory niche in which a State remains free to
apply its antiarbitration law or policy.
303
Volt was a seminal case in which the court's determination of federal
arbitration policy was paramount in connection with state/federal choice of
law rules °.3 ' There, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal policy
favoring arbitration is "to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms,
of private agreements to arbitrate. '305 As can be seen, historically the United
States Supreme Court has been more than sensitive to the policies underly-
ing the enactment of the FAA in its interpretation of this statute. This is
probably because of the Court's awareness that the ultimate purpose of
Congress in enacting the FAA was to rein in the hostile attitude of the judi-
cial branch toward this species of contract that the Congress determined
worthy of such protection.
As a result of the Supreme Court's election to resolve the issues in the
vacuum of the canons of statutory construction, the political branch will
probably be required to address the still unresolved policy questions through
consideration of amendments to the FAA in regard to the right of parties to
agree to expanded judicial review of arbitration decisions. The task of Con-
gress will be to weigh the myriad policy issues surrounding the question of
whether, under the federal arbitration statute, expanded judicial review will
be available to those who want it and the effect on the use of arbitration as a
result of not having it, after which a reasoned decision hopefully can be
reached on the merits. These issues remain after the United States Supreme
Court's Hall Street decision. They deserve to be addressed, particularly in
light of the potentially deleterious effect on the future of arbitration in the
United States of the current inability of sophisticated and willing parties to
provide for the possibility of meaningful judicial review of arbitration
awards for legal error or substantial evidence.
303. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56, (2003).
304. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. at 470.
305. Id. at 476.
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